Can "smart" cards protect us from terrorism? Do we really want to hand over our fingerprints and facial scans to the government?
Well, maybe these cards won't protect us entirely, but the government hoped that by forming the Transportation Worker Identification Credential in 2002, they could "streamline checks of criminal-background files, terrorist watch lists and immigration status for truckers, stevedores, rail and airport terminal employees, and other transit workers, among others," [source: Washington Post] using fingerprints, iris scans, or digital photographs. This means that anyone entering our ports would have to own one of these "smart" cards and the cards must be scanned before proceeding on.
Transportation workers were supposed to be given smart ID cards by the end of 2003. However, the worker-ID program has since been stalled, due to "delayed prototype testing until late 2004. Instead of the 200,000 cards planned for the pilot program, only 4,000 were issued, even as the cost rose from $12 million to $23 million." The program then missed its July deadline of this year to install card readers, so now the program has been asked by the government to conduct more security tests and report back in 2008.
I'm glad that the program is being halted. We really need to make sure that whatever technology we implement, that it's the most secure, the most researched, and the most tested.
We've seen this kind of skepticism recently with RFID passports. How secure are they really? And are we ready for them?
[via Washington Post]
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September 19, 2006 10:47 AM
The last thing we need is to rush into security decisions and leave open back doors and easily hackable technology that can be exploited by any enemy, foriegn or domestic. I'm all for more and new technology that will help keep our ports and transportation infrastructure safe, but we shouldn't let our fear overreach our rational judgement-putting something in place that's a piece of trash makes us no more secure-or at worst, less secure-than something that comes into play later and is actually functional. I agreed with you guys' perspective on RFID passports on the last podcast, by the way-it's not the technology that's the problem, it's what's done with the information. I think a lot of people get ruffled feathers at the technology, when in reality what they're afraid of ultimately is who's doing what with their personal information, or who can obtain it easily-as with many new technologies, the general public knows so little about RFID aside from the two campes that say "it's awesome and makes you safer" versus "it's horrible and opens you up to identity theft, etc etc" that as usual, most people fall into a camp based on who they believe more. I'm more worried about how long the government holds information gleaned from an RFID passport and who they share it with than the fact that the passport has an RFID chip in it.